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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to
review,
reverse,
or annul any order of the
commission,
or to suspend or delay
the
operation
or execution
of any
order.

§35-1-86 U.C.A.
II.
1.

STATEMENT OF IS8UES

Michael Blackett makes the claim that the Industrial

Commission committed reversible error when it "•..failed to refer
the medical aspects of the case back to the medical panel for a
more detailed analysis or to set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing where the medical panel members would be subject to cross
examination." (Appellant's brief at p. 1)

The real issue,

however, is, did Mr. Blackett ...marshal the evidence
of the [Commission's]
findings

are unsupported

Board of Review,

and then demonstrate

by substantial

that

evidence...?

831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992)

v. Board of Review,
2.

findings

in

support
those

Stewart

v.

See also, Merriam

812 P.2d 447, 450-451 (Utah App. 1991).

Does Michael Blackett have an unqualified right to have

a hearing on or a resubmission of his objections to the Medical
Panel Report?
3.

§35-1-77, U.C.A. (Appendix 2)

If error at all, was it harmless error for the

Industrial Commission of Utah not to further question evidence by
the psychiatric member of the medical panel who concurred that
there was no causal relationship between the May 1, 1990,
industrial event and the current reported symptoms (R. 65-66, 69)
but said that "...The patient could

be suffering from a

somatoform disorder....[and] that there was a possibility
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that

this diagnosis would be related to the May 1, 1990 injury"?
Workers

69) (Emphasis Added).

Compensation

Fund v.

(R.

Industrial

Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572 (Ut. App. 1988).
III.
1.

STANDARDS OP REVIEW

The standard of review in analyzing findings of fact by

an administrative body has been concisely stated in

Stewart,

supra.:
Because these proceedings were commenced
after January 1, 1988, our review is governed
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA), Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16
(1989). The standard for reviewing findings
of fact under UAPA is well settled.
"[F]indings of fact will be affirmed if they
are 'supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before
the court'" Merriam v. Board of Review, 812
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting
Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec,
801
P.2d 158, 161 (Utah App. 1990). "Substantial
evidence is that which a reasonable person
•might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Grace
Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
App. 1989))...
(Appendix 3)
2.

This applies to Issues 1 and 3.

Interpretation of state statutes is a question of law.

As such, the appellate court's standard of review is a correction
of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.
Morton International

v. Utah State

(Utah 1991); Questar

Pipeline

P.2d 316 (Utah 1991).

Tax Commission,

v. Utah State

814 P.2d 581

Tax Commission,

This standard applies to Issue 2.

2

817

IV,
h.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

statutes.
1.

§35-1-77 U.C.A., Medical Panel - Medical Director

or Medical Consultants - Discretionary Authority of Commission to
Refer Case - Findings and Report - Hearing - Expenses.

(Appendix

No. 2)
2.

§35-1-88 U.C.A., Rules of Evidence and Procedure

before Commission and Hearing Examiner - Admissible Evidence.
(Appendix No. 4)
B.

Rule.
R568-1-9, Industrial Commission Guidelines for

Utilization of Medical Panel (Appendix No. 7)
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Court of Appeals pursuant to a
Writ of Review (R. 101) from an Industrial Commission of Utah
Order Denying Motion For Review dated April 2, 1992, (R. 96-100,
Appendix 1).

The Commission's Order affirmed an administrative

law judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order dated
January 24, 1992, (R. 77-83, Appendix 5) denying additional
benefits to Michael Blackett.

The Commission's denial was based

in part on evidence derived from a Medical Panel Report received
by the Commission September 13, 1991, (R. 55-69, Appendix 6) as
well as all other evidence that had been presented by the
parties.
Mr. Blackett began the administrative process by filing an
Application For Hearing dated November 1, 1990, in which he
claimed an entitlement to additional workers' compensation
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benefits for an alleged work related accidental fall injury he
suffered during the course of his employment for Ralph Larsen &
Sons, Inc. when he "fell off truck while filling radiator
w/water" on May 1, 1990.

(R. 37)

The Workers Compensation Fund

of Utah responded to the Application as the insurance carrier for
Ralph Larsen & Sons, Inc. on December 13, 1990, by admitting that
there had been an accident and that it had paid certain benefits.
The Fund denied any further liability and asserted that any
continuing complaints of injury were not causally related to the
alleged event of May 1, 1990.

VI.
A.

(R.40-42)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Preliminary

It is Michael Blackett's (hereinafter "Blackett") burden to
"...marshal the evidence in support of the [Industrial
Commission's] findings and then demonstrate that those findings
are unsupported by substantial evidence..."

Stewart,

supra, at

185 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. He has made minimal, if any, attempt in
his brief to marshal the evidence.

The Statement of Material

Facts in his brief while accurate to the extent the facts are
given does not pretend to be a marshaling of the evidence in
support of the Commission's decision.

Rather, later in his

brief, Blackett cites Nyren v. Industrial

Commission,

800 P.2d

330 (Ut. App. 1990), Cert. den. 815 P.2d 241 and without
clarification states that the "...the Findings of Fact relied
upon by the Administrative Law Judge/Industrial Commission are
inadequate."

(Appellant's Brief pp. 6-7)
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Failure to marshal

the evidence as required makes the Industrial Commission's
findings conclusive.
B. Facts.
Defendants will marshal the substantial evidence which
supports the Commission's denial of benefits.
Blackett had serious back and hip injuries which predated
his industrial accident of May 1, 1990.

(R. 1-35)

On November

2, 1985, while he was employed by Mesa Moving and Storage, he was
"...unloading a refrigerator down a walk board, fell off with
refrig. [sic] on top of him.
pain down left leg.

Injured lower back, [sic] left hip

Had surgery for a shattered disk."

(Application for Hearing, December 3, 1986, R. 10)

The surgery

was performed at the St. Mark's Hospital by Dr. John C. Zahniser
on November 13, 1985.

(R. 283-290)

Dr. Zahniser had treated

Blackett beginning about 1978 for back problems associated with
lifting heavy objects.

(R. 300-307)

Dr. Zahniser gave Mr.

Blackett a permanent partial impairment rating of 20% with 10%
caused by his industrial accident which resulted in the November,
1985, surgery and 10% to conditions predating the surgery.

(R.

18) .
On December 30, 1987, Dr. Gerald R. Moress who would later
be the chairman of the Medical Panel examined Mr. Blackett on a
referral from chiropractor, Dr. Richard Wright.

The examination

was for severe post-traumatic cervical muscle spasm and headaches
as a result of a fall while he was carrying a microwave oven on
December 24, 1987. Mr. Blackett had not remembered the headaches
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and fall until reminded of them by Dr. Moress during the Medical
Panel examination as reported on August 21, 1991. (R. 60, 64)
On November 21, 1988, Western Rehabilitation Institute
through Patricia Tobin, LPT, assessed Mr. Blackett's condition as
follows:
This pt represents
a male who has been
suffering with back pain off-and-on
for
approx 10 years, most severely has been the
last year.
In the past two years, the pain
has encompassed this man's life,
resulting
in
a chronic pain situation
with decreased
function and
mobility.
(R. 215)
Before the accident in question, Mr. Blackett struggled
psychologically with obesity, depression, his wife's personality
and her ongoing pain problem.

(R. 219-220, 222)

He was off work under doctor's orders from E. Warren
Stadler, M.D. to at least June 30, 1989. (R. 203) As late as
April 25, 1990, the insurance carrier for Mesa Moving and Storage
was awarded reimbursement for temporary total disability
compensation from the Employer's Reinsurance Fund.

(R. 34)

The accident which is at issue occurred on May 1, 1990. At
the time, Michael Blackett was employed by Ralph Larsen & Sons.
He was filling the radiator of a truck with water when he fell.
He received temporary total disability compensation from the
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter the "Fund") for in
excess of five months.
by the Fund.

His medical expenses were likewise paid

(R. 37)

On the day of the injury Mr. Blackett reported to the Holy
Cross Hospital for treatment.

At that time he complained of and
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was treated for an injury to his right forearm and wrist.

He

neither made complaint of nor did he give a history of striking
his head or of experiencing any other injury.

(R. 56, 275) He

had no loss of consciousness with the fall that he could recall.
As reported to the Medical Panel by Mr. Blackettf he had no head
complaints until about one month after the accident when he was
in physical therapy for his arm.

(R. 56)

On October 17, 1990, and again on May 22, 1991, neurologist
Nathaniel M. Nord expressed the opinion to the Fund that:
...J do not believe
that Mr. Blackett
has
sustained
intracranial/central
nervous
system
injury or dysfunction
as a consequence of the
work-related
incident
of May 1, 1990.
This
opinion is shared, I believe,
by Dr. Fred
Matsuo, based upon my review of letters
which
he submitted
to your
office.
(R. 112-122)
Dr. Thomas D. Houts, M.D., who examined Mr. Blackett on a
referral from his treating physician, Dr. Taylor A. Jeppson,
likewise could find no objective signs of any disorder connected
to his May 1, 1990, accident:
The patient
sounds like he is having a lot of
physiologic
headaches,
mostly tension in type
but with occasional
migraines.
He has had
three episodes
of syncope.
These may be, in
part, related
to migraine or stress.
I do
not find evidence of an acquired
neurological
illness
or organic brain syndrome.
There
does not appear to be any obvious evidence
of
brain injury from his head
trauma...
(R. 47-49)
On August 21, 1991, the Medical Panel carefully considered
all of the medical evidence and their own examinations of Mr.
Blackett.

Their conclusions were:
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I find it incredulous
that one would
believe
that Mr. Blackett
has a post
concussion
syndrome/organic
brain syndrome secondary
to
his May 1990 industrial
incident.
There
is
no evidence
that he had any loss of
consciousness
whatsoever.
There was no
mention in the original
emergency room notes
of any problem with the headf and even Mr.
Blackett
admitted
to several
physicians
that
there was no loss of consciousness.
In
fact,
he had no headaches develop,
according
to
him, until a month after the incident
and
according
to the medical records not
until
July.
The headache mechanism appears to be
related
to cervical
muscle strain
and
tension
in agreement to many observers
who have seen
him....The
bottom line is [his blackouts]
do
not represent
any primary cerebral
electrical
even such as a seizure.
This would be in
agreement with the IME of Dr. Nord and
opinion of Dr. Matsuo.
Since there appears to be documentation
on
the record of an organic brain syndrome from
his psychological
evaluation,
I would
accept
that.
What I would not accept would be an
attempt
to find a causal relationship
between
non-existent
head injury and the onset of an
organic brain
syndrome....
Rather than looking at the 5-1-90 accident
as
an isolated
event,
I feel it has to be looked
at in terms of his premorbid
problems
including
the 1985 back injury and the very
prolonged recovery
with much
psychological
overlay
in his
recovery.
The Medical Panel went on to assert strongly its medical judgment
that none of the symptoms then being experienced by Mr. Blackett
were medically caused by the May 1, 1990, accident.

(R. 64-66)

Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne, the psychiatrist on the Medical Panel,
...J agree

concurred:
My opinion

is

that

to the industrial

entirely

there
accident

with

Dr. Moress's

was no permanent
of May 1, 1990.

partial

conclusions.
impairment

due

(R. 69)

Counsel for Mr. Blackett responded to the Medical Panel
Report on October 15, 1991. He claimed an entitlement for Mr.
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Blackett for Compensation
be referred
regards

back to the Medical

the duration

evidenced

Neurosis.

and extent

by Dr. Burgoyne's

He requested that the matter

Panel for a determination
of the psychological

letter....

(R. 71)

as

problems

Counsel did not

ask for a hearing nor did he term his letter an objection to the
Medical Panel Report.
Judge Timothy C. Allen entered his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on January 24, 1992.
Appendix 5).

(R. 77-82,

Judge Allen responded to the above request as

follows:
...[CJareful scrutiny
of Dr.
Burgoyne's
findings
indicates
that the applicant
"could
be suffering
from a somatoform
disorder."
(Emphasis added).
Dr. Burgoyne goes on to
indicate
that "There was a possibility
that
this diagnosis
would be related
to the May 1,
1990 injury."
(Emphasis added)
[T]he
foregoing
language of Dr. Burgoyne does not
satisfy
the evidentiary
requirements
in these
matters.
In these cases, medical
evidence
must be stated
in terms of reasonable
medical
probability.
(R. 77)

Judge Allen admitted the report into evidence and

adopted the findings as his own.

(R. 78)

He then entered his

findings of fact citing many of the same facts stated
hereinbefore as well as others in support of his denial of
additional benefits.

After reviewing the facts, the Industrial

Commission sustained the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge.

(R. 96-100, Appendix 1)

Blackett's counsel then filed a timely Motion for Review.
He asked that the matter be referred back to the Medical Panel
for a full review of the alleged Compensation
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Neurosis.

He did

not request a hearing on objections to the Medical Panel Report.
(R. 84-85, Appendix 8)
The refusal to refer the matter back to the Panel for
clarification, if error at all, constitutes harmless errors in
light of the record before this court. Workers
v. Industrial

Compensation

Fund

Comm'n, infra.

VII.
Argument A.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

When one is appealing from adverse findings of

fact, the law requires the appellant to "...marshal

the

evidence

in support

that

those

findings

of the

... findings

are unsupported

Board of Review,
such marshaling.

supra.

and then demonstrate

by substantial

evidence."

Merriam

v.

Blackett made little or no attempt at

Instead, he ever so briefly argues the facts as

one might do before a trier of facts. That is, he tried to paint
the facts in a light most favorable to his position while
excluding all facts that would be detrimental to his claim.
he does not like the result is a given.

That

That there were indeed

factual disputes regarding the causes of his very many physical,
mental and emotional complaints is also a given.

However, the

disputed facts were resolved by the Commission contrary to
Blackett1s interpretation.

There was substantive evidence from

the records of treating physicians, examining physicians who the
Workers Compensation Fund retained and the evidence provided by
the Medical Panel, all of which supports the denial of additional
benefits.

Contrary to Blackett1s unsupported implied assertion

that the Commission misinterpreted Dr. Burgoyne's concurrence in
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the report of Dr. Moress, the evidence overwhelmingly supports
the Commission's findings.
Argument B.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77 makes it discretionary

with the Commission to appoint a medical panel to review the
medical evidence.

It is also in the sound discretion of the

Commission by the same statute to determine whether a hearing on
objections to a medical panel report is to be held for the
purpose of cross-examining the panel members, to resubmit the
issues to the panel for clarification, or to decide that it has
enough facts upon which to base its decision.

In this case the

panel unequivocally opined that none of Mr. Blackett's current
problems were caused medically by his accident of May 1, 1990.
If the trier of facts were to find the evidence of certain of Mr.
Blackett's examining and treating physicians to be more credible,
then he should receive the additional benefits he seeks.
However, the trier of facts, the Industrial Commission, found the
more credible evidence was against awarding more benefits.
Furthermore, Blackett presented no new evidence that conflicted
with the opinions expressed by the Medical Panel. He therefore
did not comply with Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 B.
(Appendix 7) which requires a proffer of conflicting medical
evidence before the Commission will exercise its discretion to
resubmit a matter to a medical panel. Without at least such a
proffer, cross-examining the Panel is of no use.

It was left for

Blackett to convince the Commission that the evidence
preponderated in his favor.

He simply did not carry his burden

of persuasion.
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VIII.
A.

ARGUMENT

BLACKETT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE WHICH
SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S DECISION. HAD HE DONE
SO, THE ONLY CONCLUSION ONE CAN REACH IS THAT A
REASONABLE PERSON WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FACTS
AS BEING SUBSTANTIAL AND ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.

It is Blackett's responsibility to ..."marshal the
in support

of the

that

findings

those

Stewart

[Commission's] findings
are unsupported

v. Board of Review,

and then

by substantial

evidence

demonstrate
evidence."

supra.; Merriam v. Board of

Review,

supra.
In any event,
to successfully
challenge
findings
of fact made in an
administrative
proceeding,
the party seeking to upset
those
findings
must show that the findings
are "not
supported
by substantial
evidence when viewed
in light of the whole record before
the
court."
Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4)(g)
(1990) . [Citation omitted] Under this
"whole
record test,"
a party challenging
the
findings
must "marshal all of the
evidence
supporting
the findings
and show that
despite
the supporting
facts,
and in light of the
conflicting
or contradictory
evidence,
the
findings
are not supported by
substantial
evidence."
[Citations omitted]
In challenging
the ALJ's decision,
IHC
catalogues
only that evidence in the
record
most helpful
to its position,
and wholly
neglects
to amass the evidence supporting
the
ALJ's findings.
Thus, IHC has 'failed
to
completely
satisfy
[its]
obligation
to
marshal the evidence by persistently
arguing
[its]
own position
without regard for the
evidence
supporting
the [ALJ's]
findings".
[Citations omitted]
IHC v. Board of Review,

P.2d

, (Utah App. 1992), 193 Utah

Adv. Rep. 33, at 30 (Ct. App. 8/14/92).
...[EJvidence contrary
to that supporting
the
findings
should "be referred
to in
briefing
only after the supporting
evidence has been
separately
marshalled."
[Citation omitted]
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Since IHC has failed
to comply with the
marshaling requirement
in this case, we have
no occasion to consider the
evidence
supporting
its
position.
id at footnote 3, page 33.
By even a cursory reading of Blackett's brief, it is
apparent he is implying this Court should reweigh the evidence in
the most favorable light to support his claims. He is not
satisfied with the fact finder's decisions.

Ralph H. Larsen &

Sons and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah have documented
the substantial facts supporting the Commission's denial of
benefits.

The Court is again referred to that summary in the

Statement of Facts.

B.

THE EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY GIVEN
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO APPOINT A MEDICAL
PANEL TO REVIEW THE MEDICAL ISSUES OF A CASE DOES
NOT GIVE BLACKETT AN UNFETTERED RIGHT TO A HEARING
ON OR A RESUBMISSION OF HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT.

With little legal analysis and no citation to any legal
authority in point in his brief at pages 5-7, Blackett asserts
that "The ALJ should have referred the matter back to the medical
panel or, in the alternative, held a hearing."

(R. 5).

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77 of the Workers' Compensation Act
makes the appointment of a Medical Panel in any given case a
discretionary act of the Commission.

The Commission may base its

findings on the Panel Report and in the event of timely
objections may set a hearing on those objections:
(1)(a)
Upon the filing
of a
claim...the
commission may refer the medical aspects
of
the case to a medical
panel.
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****

(2) (d) The commission may base its
finding
and decision on the report of the panel . . .
or medical consultants,
Jbut is not bound by
the report if other substantial
conflicting
evidence in the case supports a contrary
finding.
(2) (e) If
filed,
the
hearing to
involved.

objections
to the report are
commission may set the case for
determine the facts and issues
. .

(2)(f)
The written report of the panel . . .
or medical consultants may be received as an
exhibit at the hearing, but may not be
considered as evidence in the case except as
far as it is sustained by the testimony
admitted.
. .
(emphasis added) (See §35-1-77 U.C.A., 1991 Cumulative
Supplement, in its entirety attached as Appendix 4.)
The language of the statute makes it clear Blackett does not
have a statutory right to a hearing on his objections to the
Medical Panel Report.

The convening of such a hearing is

discretionary with the Commission.

Utah Appellate Courts have

interpreted Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77(2)(e) in just that manner.
Moore v. American
v. Industrial

Coal Co.,

Com'n of Utah,

737 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987) and Rekward
755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988).

Blackett has not complied with Industrial Commission Rule
R568-1-9 B:

A hearing on objections
to the panel report
may be scheduled if there is a proffer of
conflicting
medical testimony showing a need
to clarify
the medical panel report.
Where
there is a proffer of new written
conflicting
medical evidence, the Administrative
Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing,
resubmit
the new evidence to the panel for
consideration
and
clarification.
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Blackett proffered no new conflicting medical evidence in
any form.
It was Blackett's burden to show his condition was medically
caused by the accident of May 1, 1990, by a preponderance of the
evidence:
"Medical evidence is insufficient
to prove
industrial
causation
of any injury if it is
equally probable that a
nonindustrial
accident
caused the condition"
[Citation
omitted]; see also Allen v.
Industrial
Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) .
******

The standard of proof for causation
is by a
preponderance
of the evidence.
Large v.
Industrial
Comm'n. 758 P.2d 954, 956.
Stokes

v. Board of Review,

185 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 23 and 24

(Ct. App. 4/22/92), Pet. for Cert, pending.

He simply failed in

that burden.
It would have been a useless act in this case to have a
hearing on the objections to the Medical Panel Report.

As shown

in the Statement of Facts, there is evidence from treating and
examining physicians that fully supports the unequivocal opinions
of the members of the medical panel.

The most that a hearing on

the Objections to the Medical Panel Report could have supplied
was for the panel members to reassert their clear opinions of no
causation.
The Industrial Commission is solely responsible for finding
facts.

The determination of credibility is the sole province of

the fact finder, not expert witnesses.

The Commission was free

to accept all or part of the Report and/or all or part of the
other evidence presented by the parties as its findings.
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It is

for the Commission to weigh the evidence.
Greyhound Lines

v. Wallace,

Rapp Construction

See for example,

728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1986); Booms v.

Company, 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986); Price

Coal Co. v. Industrial

Commission,

731 P.2d (Utah 1986).

River
The

Commission is not required to give preferential weight to a
treating physician's findings.

Rushton

v. Gelco Express,

732

P.2d 109 (Utah 1986).
The very worst that can be said about the Commission's
decision not to have a hearing or refer the matter back to the
panel for further findings based on Blackett's objection to the
Medical Panel Report is that it would make the report "hearsay".
However, the "hearsay rule" has no application in a Commission
proceeding.

The administrative law judge and the Commission may

consider any hearsay evidence presented to them which bears on
the issues being considered.

Schmidt

P.2d 693 (Utah 1980); Bunnell

v. Industrial

(Utah 1987).

v. Industrial

Comm'n, 617

Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331

The only restrictions to the admission of hearsay

evidence are: 1) that the evidence have some probative weight and
reliability, Bunnell

v. Industrial

Comm'n, supra.; and that

findings of fact not be based exclusively on hearsay.

There must

be a residuum of legal and competent substantive evidence.

That

residuum requirement can be met by evidence which is either
admitted without objection or is otherwise allowed as evidence by
rule or statute.
Industrial

See, for example, Industrial

Commission,

Power v.

187 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Ct. App. 5/13/92).

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-88 (Appendix No.4) provides:
The commission may receive
as evidence
and
use as proof of any fact in dispute
all
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evidence deemed material and relevant
including,
but not limited to the
following:
****

(b) Reports of attending or examining
physicians,
or of
pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators
appointed
by the commission.
(d) Reports of employers,
including
copies of time sheets, book accounts or other
records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an
injured or diseased
employee.
(Emphasis added).

Obviously this statute and the overall concept

of the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. Sections
35-1-1 et seq.) contemplates admission of material that would
otherwise be considered "hearsay" to which one would not have the
opportunity of cross-examination.

The concept is that if the

"...the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence,
or...technical or formal rules of procedure..." were to be
applied/ the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act to
provide speedy, inexpensive resolution of disputed issues dealing
with employees' rights to compensation would be thwarted.
Certainly, if a party had the absolute right to cross-examine
every person or entity supplying hearsay evidence, the system
would be so burdened that it could never meet its purposes. That
is why the Commission is given the discretionary authority to
appoint a Medical Panel and discretionary authority to determine
whether objections to Medical Panel Reports establish sufficient
factual controversy to set a hearing to examine the issues
further.

Here, the Commission correctly found that the objection

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-88.
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added nothing materially different to the facts and merely
constituted additional adversarial argument because the evidence
relied upon by Blackett from the report of Dr. Burgoyne "
not meet the evidentiary requirements in these matters.

does

In

workers compensation cases, medical evidence must be stated in
terms of reasonable medical probability."

(R. 96-100 at 97,

Appendix 6 hereto.)
The right of cross-examination is not an absolute right.
Cellular

Mobile

Communications

Systems

of Pennsylvania,

Commission,

Inc.

v.

Federal

782 F.2d 182, 198 (Ct. App. D.C. Dist.

1985) involved a claim that the FCC was required to give a full
hearing to applicants for a nonwire line cellular telephone
license and that the hearing should involve cross-examination of
witnesses.

The Court Said:

Cross-examination is therefore not an
automatic right conferred by the APA,
instead, its necessity must be established
under specific circumstances by the party
seeking it. The APA . . . provides only for
"such cross-examination as may be required
for a full and true disclosure of the facts .
. . In this case-by-case analysis, crossexamination is appropriately denied if the
party fails to "point to any specific
weakness in the proof which might have been
explored or developed more fully by that
technique than by the procedures adopted by
the Commission, or fails specifically to
suggest what questions were necessary to
explore the general issues to be examined, or
fails to explain why written submissions,
including rebuttal material, were
ineffectual. Absent such a showing, no
prejudice has been established . . . Crossexamination is not essential in all cases;
instead, this traditional device of truthfinding is deemed to lie within the
discretion of the ALJ, whose decision will
not be reversed by the Commission if it
reflects sound discretion. Even if a party
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successfully argues under this standard that
cross-examination should have been permitted,
the second inquiry is whether the matters
sought to be cross-examined bore
significantly upon the Commission's fact
finding and drawing of conclusions. If not,
then the party has not been prejudiced.
Due to the vagueness of Blackett's argument, it is difficult
to argue with more particularity against his assertions of a
right to have the matter referred back to the panel or to crossexamination of the Medical Panel. The proponent of a
proposition, after all, bears the burden of proof and persuasion
as to the proposition.
(Utah 1975); Hiltsley

Loesling

v. Ryder,

v. Basamkis,

539 P.2d 1043, 1046

738 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1987).

That burden has not been met.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Blackett's appeal to this Court to have the case remanded
with instructions to the Industrial Commission to have his
objections to the Medical Panel Report resubmitted to the Panel
for further consideration or in the alternative to have the
Commission convene a hearing on the objections to the Medical
Panel Report should fail for several reasons.

First, the

referral to the Medical Panel and the convening of a hearing on
objections to the Panel's report are discretionary with the
Commission pursuant to §35-1-77 U.C.A.

The Commission used its

discretion to determine that nothing could be added to the case
that had not already been considered by the Panel.
Second, Blackett did not comply with Industrial Commission
Rule R568-1-9 B. which requires an objecting party to proffer new
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conflicting
medical

medical

panel

report

testimony

showing a need to clarify

the

. . . . All Blackett did was argue that the

Panel members Drs. Burgoyne and Moress disagreed with one
another.

He chose not to believe Dr. Burgoyne when he said, I

agree entirely

with Dr. Moress's

there was no permanent partial
accident

of May 1, 1990...

conclusions.

My opinion is

impairment due to the

that

industrial

(R. 69) The Commission chose to take

Dr. Burgoyne at his word.
Third, Blackett has totally failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the Commission's findings and then show they are
unsupported by substantial evidence.

Instead he has provided the

Court with slightly more than one page of "Material Facts", none
of which support his burden to show medical causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.

(See Blackett's Brief at pages 3-

4)
Defendants ask this Court to sustain the decision of the
Industrial Commission denying Michael Blackett's application for
additional workers' compensation benefits stemming from his
accident of May 1, 1990, and that the case and record be remitted
to the Industrial Commission for action consistent therewith.
DATED this

I

day of October, 1992.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKEI

R. BLACI
unsel for Ralph H. Larsen
Sons and Workers
bmpensation Fund of Utah
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WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

DEBORAH M. LARSEN
Cocounsel for Ralph H. Larsen &
Sons and Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah
61940-1
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Appendix Number 1
Order Denying Motion For Review
dated April 2, 1992. (R. 96-100)

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 86001152
MICHAEL BLACKETT,

*

Applicant,

*

ORDER

vs.

*

DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW

RALPH H. LARSON & SONS, INC.
6 WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,

*
*
*
*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah, on Motion of the Applicant,
Michael Blackett, reviews an Order of the Administrative Law Judge
dated January 24, 1992, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-182.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
On January 24, 1992, an Order was entered by an Administrative
Law Judge of the Commission wherein it was concluded that the
Applicant was not entitled to permanent total disability, permanent
partial impairment and additional temporary total disability
benefits as the result of his industrial accident of May 1, 1991.
On January 26, 1992, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Applicant alleging that Administrative Law Judge
Allen erred in failing to refer the question of whether the
Applicant suffered from "Compensation Neurosis" back to the medical
panel for a full analysis of whether the somatoform pain disorder
was cause the industrial accident.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission
for review. It is the opinion of the Commission that the issues to
be decided are: 1) whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in
failing to refer the question of whether the Applicant suffered
from "Compensation Neurosis" back to the medical panel; and 2)
whether Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record?
A report from the psychiatric member of the panel, Dr.
Burgoyne, was forwarded to the parties as a supplemental panel
report. In response thereto, applicant made a Motion to Amend
Application for Hearing to allege that the applicant was suffering
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from compensation neurosis, based on applicant's reading of the
findings of Dr. Burgoyne. However, in reviewing the report of Dr.
Burgoyne, and the rest of the medical evidence contained on this
file, the Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant
mischaracterized Dr. Burgoyne's report.
The applicant asserts that Dr. Burgoyne clearly indicated that
the applicant suffers from a somatoform pain disorder and that this
is a result of the industrial accident. However, scrutiny of Dr.
Burgoyne's findings indicates that the applicant "could be
suffering from a somatoform disorder." (Emphasis added).
Dr.
Burgoyne goes on to indicate that "There was a possibility that
this diagnosis would be related to the May 1, 1990 injury."
(Emphasis added). The foregoing language of Dr. Burgoyne does not
satisfy the evidentiary requirements in these matters. In workers
compensation cases, medical evidence must be stated in terms of
reasonable medical probability.
It is for this very reason that the medical panel in its
charge is always instructed by the Industrial Commission to couch
its findings in terms of "reasonable medical probability".
The
Commission finds that the better view of Dr. Burgoyne's conclusions
is that any somatoform pain disorder that the applicant might have
is related to his previous psychological makeup, since Dr. Burgoyne
found that there was no organic pathology, and that the applicant's
of pain or impairment was in excess of what would be expected from
his physical findings. However, this observation by Dr. Burgoyne
is not clear proof of "compensation neurosis" as alleged by the
applicant. Rather, other than the applicant's mischaracterization
of Dr. Burgoyne's findings, there is no medical evidence whatsoever
to support the applicant's contention that he suffers "compensation
neurosis" as the result of the industrial accident.
The medical panel found that there was no post concussion
syndrome/organic brain syndrome due to the industrial accident of
May 1, 1990. The panel noted that there was no evidence whatsoever
that the applicant had any loss of consciousness. In addition,
there was no mention in the original emergency room notes of any
problem with the applicant's head, and further, the applicant
himself admitted to several physicians that there was no loss of
consciousness. Of particular importance, is the fact that the
applicant had no headaches develop until, according to the
applicant, a month after the incident, and according to the medical
records, not until July of 1990. The medical panel concluded that
the headache mechanism was related to the cervical muscle strain,
and that the applicant's blackouts are a syncopal-like episode, or
that they are some type of dissociative psychological reaction.
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Finally, the panel concluded that the applicant has "An
organic brain syndrome from his psychological evaluation. . . ."
The panel concluded that there was no causal relationship between
the "Non-existent head injury and the onset of an organic brain
syndrome. An organic brain syndrome would be related to factors
other than his 5-1-90 industrial incident."
The panel noted
further careful scrutiny should be made of the applicant's preaccident problems, "Including the 1985 back injury and the very
prolonged recovery with much psychological overlay in his
recovery."
The panel also found that the applicant was status post
L5-S1 laminectomy, discectomy, and finally, that the applicant had
an organic brain syndrome, the etiology of which was unclear, but
the panel concluded that it possibly was neurodegenerative. The
panel concluded that the foregoing diagnosis were not a result of
the industrial accident of May 1, 1990.
The panel found, in
addition, that the applicant's condition stabilized from the
industrial accident approximately one month following the accident
or June 1, 1990. The findings of the medical panel were adopted by
the Administrative Law Judge as his own and admitted into evidence.
Based upon these medical findings the Administrative Law Judge
did not err in failing to refer the issue of "compensation
neurosis" back to the medical panel. The panel had dealt with the
issue of the applicant's somatoform pain disorder and psychological
overlay at some length.
In addition, the Administrative Law
Judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court.
For the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of the Commission
that the Administrative Law Judges' Order denying the applicant
worker's compensation benefits related to the May 1, 1991,
industrial accident should be affirmed.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review,
dated January 22, 1992, is hereby denied.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the date hereof
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and
63-46b-16. Costs to prepare transcripts for appeals purposes shall
be borne by the party requesting the transcripts.

Stephen.M. Hadley
Commissioner

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Certified this ^ W ^ f
ATTEST:
Patricia O. Ashby^

day of April 1992.

~L,

oss

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on April 2, 1992, a copy of the attached
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of MICHAEL BLACKETT was
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Michael Blackett
2837 Breeze Drive
Magna, Utah 84044
Robert Breeze, Attorney
211 East 300 South #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Timothy C. Allen
Administrative Law Judge

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Legal Assistant
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Tab 2

Appendix Number 2
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-77
1991 Cumulative Supplement
Medical Panel - Medical Director or
Medical Consultants
Discretionary Authority of Commission
to Refer Case
Findings and Report - Hearing Expenses

35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission
55
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shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical
panel.
(0 A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a
tull-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same
, ™ n i . r ***• under the same procedures as required of a medical panel
U) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shali
make such study, take such X rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may
determine to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated prolonged, accelerated, cr in any way contributed to the disability or death
and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so
contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance earner may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case sunnorts a
contrary
finding.
HH"*««*
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. '
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained bv the te«?ti
mony admitted.
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(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969,
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41,
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29. 1991, substituted the
first "and" for "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and de-

leted the former second sentence, which read
"The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel under Section 35-2-56"; added Subsections (1Kb) and (c)
and redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as
(l)(d); and added the second sentence in Subsection (2Kb).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Effect of 1982 amendment.
Referral to panel.
— Discretion.
Cited.
Effect of 1982 a m e n d m e n t
In accord with bound volume. See Ortiz v.
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
This section is procedural and may be applied to an accident that occurred pnor to the
1982 amendments. Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n,
101 Utah Adv Rep. 60 (Ct. App. 1989).

Referral to panel.
—Discretion.
The court of appeals cannot say that the administrative law judge abused his discretion in
not referring the case to a medical panel when
there was medical evidence to support his finding of medical causation. Workers' Comp. Fund
v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Cited in Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n, 755
P.2d 166 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); USX Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
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Appendix Number 3
Stewart v. Board of Review
831 P.2d 134
185 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
(Apr. 29, 1992)

Cite as

185 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jennie STEWART,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial
Commission of Utah; Warner Lambert/
AmericanChickle; and Underwriters Adjusting
Company,
Respondents.
No. 910425-CA
FILED: April 29, 1992
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Lowell V. Summerhays, Murray, for
Petitioner
Henry K. Chai, II, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents Warner Lambert/American
Chickle and Underwriters Adjusting
Company
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and
Jackson.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Petitioner Jennie Stewart appeals the Industrial Commission's denial of certain benefits
sought by Stewart. We affirm.
FACTS*
On July 31, 1984, Stewart experienced a
pain in her right shoulder while lifting boxes
in the course of her employment duties.
Stewart did not report the injury to her employer, respondent American Chickle (Chickle),
nor did she seek immediate medical treatment.
Stewart continued to work and first sought
medical treatment on August 27, 1984. At that
time she saw Dr. Jerry Poulson, her family
physician, who referred her to Dr. Devon
Toone, a chiropractor. Stewart did not
mention any specific industrial injury to Dr.
Poulson. Dr. Toone first saw Stewart on
October 10 and continued treating her until
May of 1985. Dr. Toone's records indicate
that Stewart reported the injury had occurred
at work while she was lifting boxes. In a
subsequent report completed by Dr. Poulson,
the date of injury was stated as July 1984.
In a report dated November 7, 1984,
Stewart reported the injury to her employer.
In that report, Stewart indicated she did not
NCE REPORTS

CODE©CO
Provo. Utah

Stewart v. Board of Review
185 Utah Adv. Rep. 30

know how the injury occurred.
Dr. Thomas Soderburg, an orthopedic
surgeon, examined Stewart on May 1, 1985.
Both Dr. Soderburg and Dr. Kim Bertin,
another orthopedic surgeon, opined that
Stewart had a muscle strain of her right shoulder. Stewart continued working until September 12, 1985. On that date, Dr. Bertin
hospitalized Stewart and performed an acromioplasty of her right shoulder. Stewart received temporary total compensation from
workers' compensation from September 12,
1985 through March 26, 1986. On March 19,
1986, Dr. Bertin gave Stewart a permanent
partial impairment rating of four percent of
the upper extremity which he converted to a
two percent whole person permanent rating.
Chickle, through its insurance carrier, tendered a compensation agreement and check to
Stewart to compensate her for a 2.4 percent
whole person impairment. Stewart disputed
this rating.
When Stewart's temporary total disability
benefits were terminated in March of 1986,
she began receiving long-term disability
benefits. After an unrelated hospitalization in
September of 1986, Stewart returned to Dr.
Bertin with complaints of shoulder pain. Dr.
Bertin referred Stewart to Dr. Bruce Sorenson
to determine if Stewart's shoulder pain was
being caused by some cervical abnormality.
Several tests were performed and all results
were normal. Neither Dr. Bertin nor Dr.
Sorenson could determine the source of
Stewart's pain and Dr. Bertin concluded
Stewart should seek further consultation to
make sure nothing was being overlooked.
On August 25, 1987, Stewart was involved
in an automobile accident. The collision
caused the dashboard of the vehicle to be
pushed into her right arm which in turn
pushed Stewart's right shoulder back. The
armrest of the passenger door struck Stewart
on the right side below her ribs. A few days
later, Stewart sought medical treatment from
Dr. Poulson. Dr. Poulson's records indicate
Stewart had a bruise to the right shoulder and
arm as well as pain in her neck. The records
also indicate that Dr. Poulson concluded that
Stewart's problems resulting from the industrial accident had resolved and that they were
not contributing to the problems from the
automobile accident. He provided fifteen treatments which ended in March of 1988, all of
which were for treatment of the neck and
dorsal back. In a letter to Stewart's counsel
dated March 3, 1988, Dr. Poulson reported
two separate injuries. He attributed Stewart's
pain in her right shoulder to the 1984 industrial accident and gave a two percent whole
person impairment rating for that injury. Dr.
Poulson attributed the cervical spine, dorsal
spine, and right shoulder injuries to the automobile accident and gave a ten percent whole
person rating for that injury. Dr. Poulson
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concluded that most if not all of the pain
Stewart was experiencing in her shoulder was
due to pain from her cervical spine area.
At the request of the long-term disability
insurance carrier, two additional physicians
examined Stewart. Those physicians' reports
indicate that they believed the industrial accident was responsible for Stewart's pain. The
administrative law judge (ALJ)2 found that
neither of these physicians were informed
about the automobile accident or about Dr.
Poulson's conclusions. A medical panel consisting of one physician reviewed the case and
submitted a report to the ALJ on June 6,
1989. The findings of the medical panel are
summarized by the ALJ as follows:
The medical panel felt that the
applicant's complaints were cervical
in nature, rather than shoulder, and
that the applicant had a lot of
subjective complaints without objective findings. The medical panel
found a causal connection between
the right shoulder problems and the
industrial accident, and gave the
applicant a 5Vo upper extremity
rating which converts to a 3Vo
whole person. The panel also found
that the impairment led to a 30%
disability, which was beyond its
charge. In a supplemental panel
report issued April 3, 1990, the
medical panel concluded that the
automobile accident did not cause
any significant damage to the applicant's right shoulder. The panel
concluded that all of the applicant's
current complaints are related to a
cervical disc injury ... (which] was
caused by the industrial accident of
1984, and was accentuated by the
automobile accident.
The ALJ rejected the medical panel's finding
that there was a causal connection between
Stewart's cervical complaints and the 1984
industrial accident. The ALJ found there was
no medical evidence to support that finding,
and that therefore, Stewart's cervical injury
resulted from her automobile accident and not
the industrial accident.
The ALJ concluded that Stewart was entitled to a three percent whole person impairment as found by the medical panel, that
Chickle had no responsibility for treatment
resulting from the automobile accident, that
Chickle was not responsible for the medical
expenses of the two physicians to whom the
long-term disability carrier had referred
Stewart, and that ail future medical expenses
were Stewart's responsibility. Stewart moved
for review whereupon the Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
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ISSUES
Stewart challenges the ALJ's rejection of
the medical panels conclusion that her
current injury was caused by the industrial
accident. Stewart further claims that the Industrial Commission failed to determine all
findings of fact, and that there is credible
evidence in the record to support a conclusion
that the industrial accident caused all of
Stewart's injuries. Stewart asks this court to
conclude that Chickle is liable for all present
and future medical expenses incurred as a
result of that accident.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because these proceedings were commenced
after January 1, 1988, our review is governed
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
( U A P A ) , Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16
(1989). The standard for reviewing findings of
fact under UAPA is well settled. " [Findings
of fact will be affirmed if they are 'supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court.'* Merriam
v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah
App. 1991) (quoting Nelson v. Department of
Employment Sec., 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah
App. 1990)). "Substantial evidence is that
which a reasonable person 'might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id.
(quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). In
conducting this review, we examine both sides
of the record, and not simply that part of the
record which supports the ALJ's findings.
Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment
Sec., 819 P.2d 361,365 (Utah App. 1991).
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meeting her burden ,of presenting evidence
which supports the very findings she contests.
However, Stewart fails to draw this court's
attention to any flaw in the evidence upon
which the ALJ relied. See West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App. 1991) (appellant acknowledged marshaling requirement but "misperceived it"). Accordingly, because she does not marshal the
evidence in support of the ALJ's findings and
then demonstrate that those findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, we accept
the ALJ's findings as conclusive. 5 See Merriam,
812P.2dat450.
CONCLUSION
We accept the ALJ's determination that the
1984 industrial injury is not responsible for
Stewart's current pain. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. We accept the Industrial Commission's findings
of fact as conclusive because, as discussed later in
this opinion, Stewart has failed to challenge these
findings.
2. This case was originally heard by Judge Gilbert
Martinez, who took it under advisement and referred the matter to a medical panel. Before the
medical panel submitted its report, Judge Martinez
left the Industrial Commission. Judge Timothy
Allen was then assigned to the case. His findings of
fact and conclusions of law state that he reviewed
the transcript of the evidentiary hearing before
Judge Martinez as well as the complete record,
before rendering his decision. Unless otherwise
ANALYSIS
specified, this opinion's reference to the ALJ refers
On review, Stewart makes a general claim to Judge Allen.
that her current pain is a result of the 1984 3. Stewart filed a reply brief which Chickle has
industrial accident, and not, as the ALJ det- moved this court to strike. In her reply brief,
ermined, a result of the 1987 automobile acc- Stewart raises issues which were not raised before
ident. She thus challenges the ALJ's factual the Industrial Commission, in her docketing statefindings and the ALJ's rejection of the ment to this court, or in her initial appellate brief.
medical panel's opinion which agreed with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23(c) limits the
material contained in reply briefs to "answering any
Stewart's position.
new matter set forth in the opposing brief." Because
While Stewart apparently disagrees with the Stewart's brief fails to comply with this rule, we
ALJ's factual findings, she fails to challenge decline to address the issues raised therein.
those findings. As noted above, we will not 4. Stewart cites to a medical report submitted by her
disturb findings unless Stewart can demonst- physician, Dr. Poulson, which states that the pain
rate they are not supported by substantial Stewart was experiencing from the cervical area
evidence. See Merriam v. Board of Review, resulted from the automobile accident. She also
812 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah App. 1991); Grace states that because the two physicians who evaluated
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d her at the request of the long-term disability insu63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). Stewart's challenge rance carrier did not have relevant medical records,
their opinions that the industrial accident caused her
to the ALJ's findings falls short of this reqpresent pain should be rejected.
uirement.
5. We note that even were we to overlook Stewart's
After stating that, "[i]n marshaling all the failure to comply with our marshaling requirement
evidence in support of the decision, the petit- and reach the merits of this issue, the outcome
ioner sees that there is no credible evidence to would be no different.
The record is replete with documentation suppodo so," Stewart identifies the marshaling
burden and cites to evidence in the record rting the finding that Stewart's current pain resulted
upon which the ALJ relied in making his fin- from the 1987 automobile accident. Stewart was
dings. 4 On this point, Stewart comes close to treated for shoulder pain prior to the automobile
accident. No cervical damage was ever diagnosed as
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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resulting from the 1984 industrial accident. After the
automobile accident, Stewart was treated for cervical problems which even her own family physician
determined to have resulted solely from the automobile accident. The medical records reveal that
Stewart's neck was free from anatomical or functional abnormality as late as June of 1987, when she
received an MRI scan. In short, sufficient evidence
supports the ALJ's factual findings.
Further, while the ALJ rejected the medical
panel's conclusion that the automobile accident
accentuated Stewart's pain, the ALJ did adopt the
impairment rating determined by the panel. Stewart
fails to show how an alleged error in the ALJ's
factual findings made any difference in this outcome
on this point. As to whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the causation finding made by the medical
panel, it was clearly within his discretion to do so. See
Olsen v. Industrial Comm'ny 797 P.2d 1098,
1100 (Utah 1990) (appropriate for ALJ to reject
medical opinions which are not supported by credible evidence); Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d
237, 241 (Utah 1987) (when medical evidence is
conflicting, ALJ has duty to resolve factual conflict).
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Appendix Number 4
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-88
Rules of Evidence and Procedure
before Commission and Hearing
Examiner
Admissible Evidence

35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission and hearing examiner — Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the
usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in
dispute all evidence deemed matenal and relevant including, but not limited
to the following:
(a; Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts
or other records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 88: C.L. 1917,
§ 3148; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-82; L. 1965,
ch* 67, $ 1.

Meaning of "this act". — See same catchline in notes following § 35-1-46
Cross-References. — Rules for procedure of
commission, § 35-1-10
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admissibility and competency of evidence.
Appearance.
Burden of proof.
Conduct of proceedings before commission.
Constitutional rights of parties.
Delegation of power to take testimony.
General construction.
Hearsay.
Judicial notice.
Jury trial.
Raising and waiving objections.
Rehearing.
Stipulations.
Stipulation to take testimony.
Taking testimony.
Taking testimony — admissibility and competency of evidence.
Weight and sufficiency of evidence.
Cited.
Admissibility and competency of evidence.
While Industrial Commission in its investigations may have recourse to hearsay evidence
to assist it at arriving at real facts, when it
makes its findings every finding of fact must
be based on some substantial legal and competent evidence, and every material finding that
is entirely based on hearsay or other incompetent evidence not supported by substantial evidence cannot be permitted to stand if properly
assailed. Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 53 Utah 133, 178 P. 57 (1918).
Industrial Commission erred in permitting
some witnesses to testify as to the statements
made by deceased employee before he died, and
other witnesses to state their conclusions or
inferences m violation of rule limiting admission of incompetent evidence before commission. Rockefeller v. Industrial Comm'n, 58
Utah 124. 197 P. 1038 (1921).
In view of provisions of this section,
N 35-1-78, 35-1-85 (now repealed) and
35-1-86, commission may deny award to nonresident alien father of deceased employee,
though evidence of partial dependency was uncontradicted where evidence was somewhat
fragmentary and not in all respects satisfactory or convincing, being mostly depositions
and letters, but commission may not arbitrarily or capriciously deny award. Kavalinakis v.
industrial Comm'n, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698
' 1926).
In proceeding for compensation for death of
mmer, declaration of deceased made to his
companion when rocks were falling that he had
been hit in back with rock was part or res gestae and evidence as to that was not open to
objection that it was hearsay. Chief Consol.

Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Utah 333,
260 P. 271 (1927).
Whether the present disabilities are or are
not attributable to the injuries received at time
of accident, when constituting the ultimate
fact or question to be determined by the commission, may be decided without accepting a
mere opinion of an expert. Utah Delaware
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187,
289 P. 94 (1930).
In proceeding for compensation for death of
city employee who died from acute dilatation
or collapse of heart resulting from overexertion
or strain while working on reservoir, declarations of deceased to doctor as to nature and
extent of pain and as to nature of work, and
declarations to wife as to pain were admissible,
as against contention that such evidence was
hearsay. Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84
Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934).
Whether an employee is totally disabled or
permanently disabled are ultimate matters to
be decided by the commission, as is also
amount and time compensation may be
awarded upon all the evidence; and upon these
ultimate questions expert witnesses may not
properly express opinions, nor may such opinions relating to loss of bodily function become
measure of compensable function possessed by
an employee prior to his injury. Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188,
affd, 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935).
All transmitted evidence, such as declarations and statements by employee to another,
have been held to be incompetent. Nor is commission compelled to accept circumstantial evidence and where evidence of accident is ail
hearsay, mere narratives of a past event, with
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no element of spontaneity, it is inadmissible.
Boyd v Industrial Comm'n. 88 Utah 173, 48
P.2d 498 (1936), rehearing denied, 88 Utah
184, 53 P.2d 80 (1935).
When the matter is one within the knowledge of laymen, the Industrial Commission
need not decide according to testimony given
by experts. Caillet v. Industrial Comm'n, 90
Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936).
Industrial Commission is not bound to accept
opinion of physician testifying as an expert unless such is the only reasonable conclusion to
reach in the premises. Ellis v. Industrial
Comm'n, 91 Utah 432. 64 P.2d 363 (1937).
Commission is not bound to follow opinion of
expert as to whether claimant has suffered
total permanent disability, but may make its
own finding from consideration of all the evidence. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n. 93 Utah
493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937).
This section plainly changes the rules of evidence in cases within the act l§ 35-1-1 et seq.).
It authorizes the commission to receive and
consider any kind of evidence that may throw
light on a pending claim. The statute, however,
does not declare the probative force of any evidence, but declares the aim and end of the investigation shall be "ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the
spirit of the title." Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376
(1942).
In a proceeding to determine disability, the
commission properly received into evidence the
reports of a physician although they were hearsay. Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah
2d 312. 358 P.2d 899 (1961).
Hearsay admissions are not prejudicial
where the facts abstracted by the Industrial
Commission did not compel a reversal on the
ground that the commission was arbitrary and
capncious in entering its order. Williams v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 169,406 P.2d 707
(1965).
Appearance.
By responding to notice sent out by commission and stipulating certain facts relating to
employer, employers counsel and process
agent in effect entered general appearance although they stated they were appearing specially to object to commission's assumption of
jurisdiction. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077
(1937).
Burden of proof.
The burden of proof is on applicant to establish before the Industrial Commission that the
injury resulted from the employee's employment, and this must be done by a preponderance of the evidence. Grasteit v. Industrial
Commn, 76 Utah 487, 290 P. 764 (1930);
Whemtt v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 68,

110 P.2d 374 (1941): General Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 101 Utah 214, 120 P.2d 279
(1941).
Where plaintiff filed written objections to
the report of the medical panel and objected to
the report at the hearing, the burden was on
the commission or the employer to sustain it
and, where this was not done, the report could
not be considered as evidence. Hackford v. Industrial Commn. 11 Utah 312, 358 P.2d 899
(1961).
The burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove
the extent of his disability; where plaintiff introduces evidence that he is unemployable and
a medical panel rates his medical disability at
50%, it is within the discretion of the commission to find a 509e disability. Shipley v. C & W
Contracting Co.. 528 P.2d 153 (Utah 1974).
The burden of proof in workmen's compensation cases is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592
P.2d 616 (Utah 1979).
Conduct of proceedings before commission.
Proceedings before Industrial Commission
are very informal and in some respects "sui
generis.'* Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
59 Utah 46, 201 P. 1034 (1921).
Except for the application or petition of the
applicant, pleadings are not necessary and
generally are not filed. The hearings are informal in manner, time, and place. There is no
attempt to observe the forms of rules which
govern judicial trials, and the strict and formal
rules of judicial procedure are as inapplicable
to the form and manner of making objections
and defenses as they are to the presentation
and proof of claims for compensation. The main
reason back of ail of this was to enable lay
members of society, if necessary, to prosecute
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. with the assistance, if necessary, of
the Industrial Commission. Taslich v. Industrial Comm'n. 71 Utah 33, 262 P. 281 (1927).
The same procedure is specified in all cases,
irrespective of who or what the employer may
be and whether compensation is assured by an
insurance company, the state insurance fund,
or the employer as a self-insurer. No difference
can be made between the different kinds of employers and insurance carriers, but all must be
treated alike. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n,
74 Utah 309. 279 P. 609 (1929).
A broad discretion is vested in Industrial
Commission by this section with respect to
manner in which its investigations shall be
conducted, and unless it is shown that some
substantial right of a party has been denied
him. or that he has been deprived of an opportunity to fairly and fully develop his case. Supreme Court will not interfere to direct method
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gate to deputy, designated as referee, the
power to take testimony in support of or
against the application of anyone asking relief
before commission: and the power to take testimony necessarily carries with it the authority
to administer oaths. Utah Copper Co. v. Industnal Comm'n, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24, 13
A.L.R. 1367 (1920).

of conducting such heanngs. Spencer v Industrial Comm n, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (1933).
Where there is a conflict in the testimony,
and the weight and credibility to be given testimony of the various witnesses is the determining factor, in order to accord a "full hearing' to which ail litigants are entitled, the person who conducts the hearing, hears the testimony, ana sees the witnesses while testifying,
whether a member of the board of an examiner
3r referee, must either participate in the decision or where, at the time the decision is rendered, he has severed his connections with the
Doard, commission or fact-finding body, the
-ecord must show affirmatively that the one
who finds the facts had access to the benefit of
us findings, conclusions and impressions of
>uch testimony by either written or oral reports thereof. This does not necessarily require
ill of the commissioners to be present at the
leanng, or even that the one hearing the evilence must concur in the result, but his opinon on the testimony must be available to the
:ommission in making its decision. Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321,
148 A.L.R. 316 (1943); E.C. Olsen Co. v. State
Tax Commn, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324
1946).

General construction.
Provisions of this section conferring upon Industnal Commission wide discretion in ascertaining substantial nghts of parties should be
construed in conjunction with § 35-1-78 in determining powers of commission under provision confexnng upon it continuing junsdiction
in compensation cases. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Industnal Comm'n, 69 Utah 102, 252 P. 567
(1926).
The commisssion is not bound by the rules of
evidence recognized by the common law.
Ogden Iron Works v. Industnal Comm'n, 102
Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).

Constitutional rights of parties.
While the Industrial Commission is given
Dower to adopt its own rules of procedure
§ 35-1-10), and is not bound by the usual comnon-law or statutory rules of evidence or by
my technical or formal rules of procedure,
iiles promulgated by the commission must not
lepnve parties of constitutional rights to day
n court and of having cause determined after
mpartial hearing. Ocean Accident & Guaranee Corp. v Industrial Commn, 66 Utah 600,
45 P. 343 (1926)
Industrial Commission, in exercising its
ights to proceed without certain formalities
nder this section, must not deprive any party
f every fair means of eliciting facts to be
nally determined nor unnecessarily limit
-oss-examination of witnesses. Ocean Acci?nt & Guarantee Corp. v. Industnal Commn,
5 Utah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926).
An award of compensation, supported by
ibstantial competent evidence, will not be re»rsed on the ground that appellant was deed a fair and impartial heanng where it does
»t appear witnesses were in any way hindered
influenced by the hearing examiner, and it
es not appear that said witnesses were not
ven opportunity to, or did not freely give
eir opinions respecting the matter about
uch they were interrogated. Ocean Accident
Guarantee Corp. v Industrial Commn, 66
ah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926).
legation of power to take testimony.
ndustnal Commission has authority to dele-

Hearsay.
Hearsay rule has no application m a commission proceeding and the commission and its
hearing officers may receive and consider any
hearsay evidence presented to it. Schmidt v.
Industnal Commn, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).
The hearsay rule does not apply in administrative heanngs. Bunnell v. Industnal
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987).
Judicial notice.
Rule that court may take judicial notice of
proceedings and records in the cause before it,
but cannot in one case take judicial notice of its
own records in another and different case, applies to Industnal Commission. Spencer v. Industnal Commn, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618
(1933).
Neither Utah Industnal Commission nor Supreme Court of this state can take judicial notice of workmen's compensation laws of another state. If not offered in evidence, presumption is that they are the same as those of the
forum. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industnal Comm'n, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591
(1944).
Jury trial*
Industnal Commission is not a court, court
procedure is not applicable to proceedings before it, and it has no power to grant demand for
jury tnal to try issue of fact. Palle v. Industnal
Comm'n, 81 Utah 372, 18 P.2d 299 (1933).
Raising and waiving objections.
Employer and insurer could not complain of
introduction into evidence of report made a
year earlier by their own doctor as to claimant's condition the day following the closing of
the hearing, as they had knowledge of its contents and could not have been taken by sur-
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rules of evidence ordinarily obtaining in the
trial of cases was to throw as much light as
possible upon the general situation in an industrial case. Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937).
Commission should not receive evidence on
disputed matters where a hearing is held after
the hearing is closed. Tintic Std. Mining Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 96, 110 P.2d 367
(1941).

prise. Tintic Std. Mining Co. v. Industrial
Commn, 100 Utah 96, 110 P.2d 367 (1941).
Rehearing.
Notice of hearing on petition for rehearing is
not required where, after rehearing is granted,
applicant is given notice of second hearing and,
hence, ail his rights are fully protected. Pinyon
Queen Mining Co. v. Industrial Commn, 59
Utah 402. 204 P. 323 (1922).
Stipulations.
In compensation cases stipulations as to jurisdictional facts are to be encouraged because
they shorten the proceedings and take from applicants burden of proving matters about
which ordinarily there should be no dispute.
General Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99
Utah 293, 105 P.2d 340 (1940).
Stipulation that employee received accident
arising out of or in course of employment
would be considered withdrawn or negated,
where investigation showed that date of accident had been erroneously stated. General
Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Commn, 99 Utah 293,
105 P.2d 340 (1940).
Question whether defendant employer has
stipulated certain facts as true depends upon
terms of stipulation. Smith v. Industrial
Commn, 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314 (1943).

Taking testimony—admissibility and competency of evidence.
Physician's testimony regarding statement
made to him by claimant's wife concerning
claimant's health prior to alleged injury was
admissible before board despite its hearsay nature. Pruce v. Fruehauf Corp., 27 Utah 2d 370,
496 P.2d 712 (1972).

Stipulation to take testimony.
Attorney for applicant was not required to
make statement to Industrial Commission of
what he proposed to prove by witness where he
relied upon stipulation to take further testimony. McVicar v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah
342, 191 P. 1089 (1920).
Taking testimony.
When an award of compensation has been
annulled and the commission again considers
the question of whether or not compensation
should be allowed, the commission may, by
reason of the provisions of this section, consider evidence received at the hearing or hearings had before the award was annulled.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial Commn,
74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929).
This section was not intended to authorize
the commission in receiving and considering
evidence to disregard the common-law or statutory rules of evidence and adopt those of
Latin countries. Diaz v. Industrial Commn, 80
Utah 77, 13 P.2d 307 (1932).
Commission may not, without cause or reason, disregard or refuse to give effect to uncontradicted evidence, nor may commission,
whether it makes findings of fact or not, arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to believe and to
act upon credible evidence which is
unquestioned and undisputed. Spencer v. Industrial Commn, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188,
afTd 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935).
The purpose of this section in relaxing the

Weight and sufficiency of evidence.
Industrial Commission is not authorized to
make rules prescribing what evidence is necessary to warrant recovery in hernia cases since
such involves substantive law which Legislature delegated no power to commission. Livingston v. Industrial Commn, 68 Utah 567,251 P.
368 (1926).
The preponderance of evidence rule applies
in proceedings to establish claims before the
Industrial Commission. Grasteit v. Industrial
Comm'n, 76 Utah 487, 290 P. 764 (1930).
Industrial Commission is not required to believe uncontradicted evidence unless there is
nothing in the record which is intrinsically discrediting to such testimony. Gerber v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 479, 64 P.2d 1281
(1937).
Industrial Commission cannot compel certain sorts of evidence, but must take cases as
they are presented with such evidence as nature of case permits, and from such evidence
come to its conclusion, rather than from fact
that certain type of evidence, presentation of
which it makes a condition precedent, has not
been forthcoming. Milkovich v. Industrial
Comm'n, 91 Utah 498, 64 P.2d 1290 (1937).
There must be a residuum of evidence, legal
and competent in a court of law, to support a
claim before an award can be made; and a finding cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence. Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial
Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).
This section means that the commission may
act upon hearsay evidence where the circumstances are such that the evidence offered is
deemed by the commission to be trustworthy.
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102
Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).
Industrial Commission is entitled to disbelieve the testimony of an interested witness.
Godfrey v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 Utah 324,
142 P.2d 174 (1943).
The commission is not bound to accept the
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testimony of plaintiff as to the cause of his eye
injury to the exclusion of all other testimony
and record evidence. Lorange v. Industrial
Comm'n, 107 Utah 261, 153 P.2d 272 (1944).
Although the commission may receive and
consider any kind of evidence that may throw
light on a pending claim, there must be a
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a
court of law, to support an award, and a finding
cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence.
Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d
312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961).
The commission must look at all relevant evidence in reaching its findings without being

35-1-90

restricted to giving evidence from specific witnesses more weight than that from other witnesses. Rushton v. Gelco Express & Employers
Mut Liab., 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986).
The administrative law judge was not required as a matter of law to accept the findings
of plaintiffs treating physician and reject those
of the medical panel. Rushton v. Gelco Express
& Employers Mut. Liab., 732 P.2d 109 (Utah
1986).
Cited in Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744
P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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A.L.R. — Workmen's compensation: use of
medical books or treatises as independent evidence, 17 A.L.R.3d 993.

Hearsay evidence in proceedings before state
administrative agencies, 36 A.L.R.3d 12.
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«= 1165.
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Appendix Number 5
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law
and Order
dated January 24, 1992. (R. 77-83)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 86001152

MICHAEL BLACKETT,

*
*

Applicant,

FINDINGS OF FACT

*
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

*
AND ORDER

RALPH H. LARSEN & SONS, INC. and/or*
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
*
OF UTAH,
*
Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The parties hereto stipulated that the case could be referred
directly to the medical panel, since there were only medical issues
involved. The medical panel report was received by the Commission
and copies were forwarded to the parties. Thereafter, a report
from the psychiatric member of the panel, Dr. Burgoyne, was also
forwarded to the parties as a supplemental panel report.
In
response thereto, applicant, by and through counsel, made a Motion
to Amend Application for Hearing to allege that the applicant was
suffering from compensation neurosis, based on applicant's reading
of the findings of Dr. Burgoyne. However, in reviewing the report
of Dr. Burgoyne, and the rest of the medical evidence contained on
this file, I find that the applicant has mischaracterized Dr.
Burgoyne's report. The applicant feels that Dr. Burgoyne indicates
that the applicant clearly suffers from a somatoform pain disorder
and that this is a result of the industrial accident. However,
careful scrutiny of Dr. Burgoyne's findings indicates that the
applicant "could be suffering from a somatoform disorder."
(Emphasis added). Dr. Burgoyne goes on to indicate that "There was
a possibility that this diagnosis would be related to the May 1,
1990 injury." (Emphasis added). As so aptly noted by the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, the foregoing language of Dr. Burgoyne
does not satisfy the evidentiary requirements in these matters. In
these cases, medical evidence must be stated in terms of reasonable
medical probability. It is for this reason that the medical panel
in its charge is always instructed by the Industrial Commission to
couch its findings in terms of "reasonable medical probability".
I find that the better view of Dr. Burgoyne7s conclusions is that
any somatoform pain disorder that the applicant might have would be
related to his previous psychological makeup, since Dr. Burgoyne
found that there was no organic pathology, and that the applicant's
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complaint of pain or impairment was in excess of what would be
expected from his physical findings. However, that observation by
Dr. Burgoyne is not clear proof of compensation neurosis as alleged
by the applicant.
Rather, other than the applicant's
mischaracterization of Dr. Burgoyne's findings, there is no medical
evidence whatsoever to support the applicant's contention that he
suffers compensation neurosis as the result of the industrial
accident. Accordingly, I find that the applicant's attempt to
amend his Application to allege a compensation neurosis should be,
and the same is hereby dismissed.
I find that the medical panel report is a very thorough and
thoughtful analysis of the medical issues and opinions contained on
this file. Having reviewed the medical evidence on the file, I
find that the medical panel's analysis of that evidence is balanced
and well reasoned, and accordingly, the medical panel report is
admitted into evidence and the findings therein are adopted by the
Administrative Law Judge as his own.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant herein, Michael Blackett,
sustained a
compensable industrial accident on May 1, 1990, while employed by
Ralph H. Larsen & Sons. The applicant was working as a truck
driver, and was in the Kanab, Utah, area when he had some problems
with the radiator of his truck.
He stayed overnight and the
following morning was standing on the frame of the truck, when he
touched the radiator, which was quite hot, with his hand. Of
course, his hand instinctively retracted and his wrist struck a
part of the truck. The applicant had this happen a second time,
and, on that occasion, he stepped backward and fell onto the fine
gravel surface striking his back, shoulder and head. The medical
records contained on the file clearly indicate that the applicant
was not knocked unconscious. The applicant did not make a big deal
out of his fall, and on his way back to Salt Lake City, noted a
swelling in his right arm. The applicant reported to the Holy
Cross Emergency Room.
At the emergency room, the applicant was seen for a contusion
of the right forearm resulting from his industrial accident. There
was no mention whatsoever of any injury to any other part of the
applicant's body including his head. Over the next two weeks, the
applicant continued to have complaints in his right arm and was
sent to physical therapy. The applicant was complaining of pain
from the wrist up to the upper arm and shoulder and pain into the
neck. The applicant denied any neurological loss and none was
noted.
The applicant received follow-up treatment, and was
referred to a physiatrist, Dr. Griffin, for physical medicine

078

MICHAEL BLACKETT
ORDER
PAGE THREE
treatment. An EMG performed on June 1, 1990, of the applicant's
right upper extremity was normal.
Dr. Griffin saw the applicant on June 6, 1990, and at that
time made a diagnosis of a possible C6 radiculopathy and possible
reflex sympathetic dystrophy. A bone scan failed to confirm the
diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy and a CT scan if the
applicant's neck was normal.
By the end of June, 1990, the
applicant was found to have decreased sensitivity of the entire
right upper extremity, and was thought to have myofascial type pain
in the trapezius. The first mention of any complaints of headaches
by the applicant was noted on July 11, 1990, when the applicant
complained that the headaches were also associated with dizziness.
The applicant had an episode at home whereby he fell down and had
a loss of urine. Because of these headaches, the applicant was
referred to a neurologist, Dr. David Smith.
Dr. Smith saw the applicant on July 16, 1990, and his history
indicated that the applicant did not have a loss of consciousness
as the result of the industrial injury of May 1, 1990. Dr. Smith
also stated that the applicant did not have headaches until the end
of July. Dr. Smith diagnosed a possible complex partial seizure
disorder and recommended that the applicant receive an EEG and an
MRI. The EEG was negative, while the MRI showed some focal white
matter disease, which was felt to be of no clinical significance.
Dr. Smith felt that the applicant had complex partial seizures and
started the applicant on Dilantin. Dr. Smith recommended that the
applicant receive a psychological assessment. Dr. Smith provided
no treatment to the applicant beyond September 1990.
On October 3, 1990, the applicant returned to the Holy Cross
Emergency Room complaining of falling asleep, dizziness, and
inability to function. At that time, the applicant was on Prozac,
and it was opined that he was lethargic, and dizzy and possibly had
a psychological component.
The applicant received various
evaluations from numerous health care providers.
The applicant denied headaches before May 1, 1990. However,
the applicant was seen on December 30, 1987, by Dr. Moress upon the
referral of a chiropractor, Dr. Richard Wright. The applicant had
fallen on December 24, 1987, while carrying a microwave oven. As
a result, the applicant struck his left hip and shoulder and also
began having severe neck pain, as well occipital temporal
headaches. The applicant described those headaches as a 5-6/10
intensity. Dr. Moress concluded that the headaches were related to
his cervical ligamentous strain problem compounded by some cervical
arthritis.
These headaches of 1987, lasted approximately 3-4
months.
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On November 2, 1985, the applicant sustained an industrial
accident to his low back.
He received back surgery from Dr.
Zahniser at the St. Marks Hospital. The applicant had a difficult
recovery, and was out of work for four years. The applicant was
followed extensively by Dr. Stadler of the Western Rehabilitation
Institute. Dr. Stadler on July 15, 1988, diagnosed the applicants
condition as a failed back syndrome associated with social
problems. On August 4, 1988, Dr. Stadler found that the applicant
had an inconsistent examination with symptom magnification. Dr.
Lighty performed a psychological evaluation on the applicant and
concluded that the applicant had a lack of confidence in ability to
manage pain, significant affective distress with depression and
anxiety, psychosocial stressors, minimizing somatizing coping style
and deconditioning.
The applicant was eventually given a 2 0%
permanent partial impairment rating, with 10% being due to the
industrial accident and 10% being due to pre-existing problems.
The medical panel found that there was no post concussion
syndrome/organic brain syndrome due to the industrial accident of
May 1, 1990. The panel noted that there was no evidence whatsoever
that the applicant had any loss of consciousness. In addition,
there was no mention in the original emergency room notes of any
problem with the applicant's head, and further, the applicant
himself admitted to several physicians that there was no loss of
consciousness. Of particular importance, is the fact that the
applicant had no headaches develop until, according to the
applicant, a month after the incident, and according to the medical
records, not until July of 1990. The medical panel concluded that
the headache mechanism was related to the cervical muscle strain in
tension, and that the applicant's blackouts are a syncopal-like
episode, or that they are some type of dissociative psychological
reaction. The medical panel concluded that the applicant did not
have "Any primary cerebral electrical event such as a seizure.11
Rather, the panel concluded that the applicant has "An organic
brain syndrome from his psychological evaluation. . . . " The panel
concluded that there was no causal relationship between the "Nonexistent head injury and the onset of an organic brain syndrome. An
organic brain syndrome would be related to factors other than his
5-1-90 industrial incident." The panel also noted that careful
scrutiny should be made of the applicant's pre-morbid problems,
"Including the 1985 back injury and the very prolonged recovery
with much psychological overlay in his recovery."
The medical panel found, in terms of reasonable medical
probability, that the applicant's headaches were related to his
cervical musculoligamentous strain and tension. The panel also
found that there were episodic alterations of consciousness that
were not related to seizures or any other identifiable organic
source. The panel also found that the applicant was status post
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L5-S1 laminectomy, discectomy, and finally, that the applicant had
an organic brain syndrome, the etiology of which was unclear, but
the panel concluded that it possibly was neurodegenerative. The
panel concluded that the foregoing diagnosis were not a result of
the industrial accident of May 1, 1990.
The panel found, in
addition, that the applicant's condition stabilized from the
industrial accident one month following the accident or June 1,
1990.
As indicated previously, the Administrative Law Judge adopts
the findings of the medical panel as his own.
The defendants in this matter have paid the applicant
temporary total disability at the rate of $222.00 per week for the
period May 2, 1990 through October 19, 1990, for a total of
$7,216.90. Pursuant to the medical panel findings, the applicant
is entitled to one month of temporary total disability or 4.3 3
weeks at the rate of $222.00 per week for a total award of $961.26.
Since the applicant has been paid $7,216.90, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah has overpaid the applicant $6,255.64.
The medical panel also found that there was no permanent
impairment due to the industrial accident of May 1, 1990.
Accordingly, since there is no permanent impairment due to the
industrial accident, by necessity, the applicant's claim for
permanent total disability must also fall. Finally, there was a
dispute concerning the amount of medical care received by the
applicant. The medical panel found that medical treatment related
to the industrial accident should end on September 11, 1990, when
the applicant was last seen by Dr. Smith.
Accordingly, the
applicant is entitled to all medical expenses incurred for the
period May 1, 1990 through September 11, 1990.
Any expenses
incurred after September 11, 1990, are the responsibility of the
applicant.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Michael Blackett
alleging permanent total disability, permanent partial impairment,
and additional temporary total disability as the result of his
industrial accident of May 1, 1990, while employed by Ralph H.
Larsen & Sons, Inc., should be, and the same is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ralph H. Larsen & Sons, Inc.,
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay all medical
expenses incurred by the applicant on or before September 11, 1990,
as the result of the industrial accident of May 1, 1990. Said
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expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee
Schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

the
the
and
not

Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
.day of January, 1992.
ATTEST:

C*£

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January ?Y
, 1992, a copy of the
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the
case of Michael Blackett, was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:
Michael Blackett, 2837 Breeze Drive, Magna, UT

84044

Robert Breeze, Atty., 211 East 300 South, #215, SLC, UT 84111
Deborah Larsen, Atty., Workers Compensation Fund of Utah

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By ?/{^Jf

faJL^?^

Wilma Burrows
A^T/'Adjudication Division
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Appendix Number 6
Medical Panel Report of August 21,
1991 with Concurrence of Dr.
Burgoyne dated September 16, 1991.
(R. 55-69)

Gerald R. Moress M.D., RC.
370 E

- S o u t h TemP,e' Suite 3 0 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Teleohor.e (801) 363-7386

NEUROLOGY

August 2 1 ,

1991

Judge Timothy Allen
State of Utah
Adjudication Division
P. 0. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84141-0250
Re: Michael Blackett
Inj: 5-1-90
Emp: Ralph H. Larsen & Sons, Inc.
Dear Judge Allen:
A panel composed of Gerald R. Moress, M.D. neurologist,
chairman and Robert Burgoyne, M.D. psychiatrist, panel
chairman, considered the medical matters of Mr. Blackett.
His medical records were available for review.
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL INJURY:
5-1-90 Mr. Blackett was working for Ralph H. Larsen & Sons as
a truck driver. He was in Kanab and had had some problems
with the radiator of his truck. He had stayed overnight and
the next morning he was standing on the frame of the truck and
touched the radiator with his hand which was quite hot. His
hand reflexively retracted and his wrist struck something.
This happened a second time and on the second occasion he
stepped backward and fell onto the fine gravel surface,
striking his back, shoulder, and his head. He does not feel
that he was knocked unconscious, and if that did occur it
would be no longer than a brief second. He said that he did
not make a big deal out of his fall. On his way back to Salt
Lake he noted a swelling of his right arm and went to the Holy

053

Cross Emergency Room.
The date of service at Holy Cross Emergency Room was 5-1-90
where he was seen for contusion of the right forearm that had
occurred with the truck incident. There was no mention of any
injury to any other part of his body including the head. The
doctor did not ask him any question about the loss of
consciousness or head injury. The diagnosis was contusion of
the right forearm. Over the ensuing two weeks he continued
to have complaints in the right arm and was sent to physical
therapy. The complaints were from the wrist up to the upper
arm and shoulder and now pain into the neck. He denied any
neurological loss. On 5-15-90 the follow up Emergency Room
visit still found right arm pain with a possible radicular
component. He was referred to physiatrist Ben Griffin. I
asked Mr. Blackett if he specifically had any headaches
initially and he said he did not have any.
He said the
headaches began about a month after the injury when he was in
therapy and they thought at first it was due to tight muscles
or something in his jaw.
An EMG performed 6-1-90 of the right upper extremity was
normal.
Dr. Griffin saw him on 6-6-90 with a diagnosis of possible C6
radiculopathy and possible reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) .
A bone scan did not confirm the diagnosis of RSD and the CT
scan of the neck was normal. By the end of June he was found
to have decreased sensitivity of the entire right upper
extremity, and he was thought to have myofascial type pain in
the trapezius and temporalis muscle with trigger points. It
was not until the 7-11-90 visit that specific headaches were
mentioned associated with dizziness. He had an episode at
home when he fell down with loss of urine. Because of the
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headaches and the passing out spell he was referred to
neurologist David Smith.
Dr. Smith's evaluation was 7-16-90. His history included the
statement that Mr. Blackett did not have a loss of
consciousness with his 5-1-90 industrial incident. He also
mentioned that it was not until the end of July that he
developed the headaches. In addition, the episode of passing
out that had recently occurred was mentioned.
Dr. Smith
diagnosed a possible complex partial seizure disorder and
recommend an EEG and MRI. The EEG showed no epileptiform
activity and the MRI showed some focal white matter disease
that was felt not to be of any clinical significance. Dr.
Smith felt because of a left temporal rare sharp wave that the
patient had complex partial seizures and was started on an
anticonvulsant.
He continued to fall despite being on
Dilantin and in August Dr. Smith now diagnosed a post
concussive syndrome with possible seizures and mentioned that
psychological evaluation might help. Dr. Smith gave a series
of trigger point injections which Mr. Blackett said made him
worse. Some family problems were mentioned by Dr. Smith and
again re-emphasized the need for psychological assessment.
He was not seen by Dr. Smith beyond September 1990.
Mr. Blackett returned to the Holy Cross Emergency Room on 103-90 because of falling asleep, dizzy, cannot function. He
was on Prozac and it was felt that he was lethargic and dizzy
and possibly had a psychological component.
On four separate visits in September through November of 1990
Mr. Blackett was evaluated by psychologist Dr. Gregory Mayer
at the request of the Fund. It was Dr. Mayer's assessment
that Mr. Blackett had cognitive deficits not consistent with
his past educational and occupational histories.
He had
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problems in attention/concentration. Psychomotor slowing was
noted. A factitious disorder was considered but felt to be
unlikely. Anxiety and depression were mentioned as a possible
source for some of his complaints. He was felt to have neural
behavioral problems consistent with an organic brain
dysfunction. He was found to have a full scale IQ of 92,
verbal of 89 and a performance of 99.
Neurologist Nat Nord saw Mr. Blackett on 10-17-90 for the
Fund. He was complaining of occipital and cervical pains,
right trapezius pain, headaches, ear pressure, lightheadedness and vertigo, as well as black outs which had
occurred on several occasions with one lasting 30-40 minutes.
Dr. Nord repeated an electroencephalogram that showed no
epileptiform activity. Dr. Nord did not feel that the patient
had a seizure disorder. He felt that there was a tenuous
causal relationship between his headaches and his industrial
incident. He felt that many of the complaints were functional
in nature and that he was stable. He gave him a 30 day TTD
as a result of his industrial accident. Dr. Nord did not feel
that there was a closed head injury, post traumatic
encephalopathy, nor was there any evidence of vestibular
abnormality on testing done at Holy Cross to detect such a
problem.
Psychiatrist Dave McCann performed an evaluation for the Fund
on 4-30-91 and based on the interview and information
available to him, he diagnosed an organic mental disorder
based on the findings of Dr. Mayer and whether the dysfunction
was caused by a closed head injury was in question. He felt
the psychological diagnosis was related to the industrial
injury of May 1990. He did not feel he had a post-traumatic
stress disorder.
He felt he was temporally and totally
disabled. He did not want to give him an impairment rating
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at that time.
Mr. Blackett was seen for rehabilitation group Heal and
Company by Dr. Matsuo, a neurologist at the University Medical
Center 12-26-90.
Dr. Matsuo mentioned a possible posttraumatic stress disorder. He did not feel he had a seizure
disorder.
He mentioned pre-existing symptoms of motion
sickness and labyrinthitis in 1982, erratic sleep habits were
mentioned since 1959. In another note dictated 2 weeks later
to Heal and Company Dr. Matsuo mentioned that he could not
identify evidence of permanent central nervous system damage
resulting from his 5-1-90 accident. He felt the episodes of
loss of consciousness were some type of syncopal episode and
not epileptic.
At the request of his family physician, Taylor Jeppsen, he
was seen
for another neurological consultation on his own
6-11-91 by neurologist, Tom Houts. Dr. Houts felt that the
patient had physiologic headaches, most probably tension but
possibly occasional migraine. The syncopal episodes he felt
were related to his headaches or stress. He found no evidence
of any neurological illness or organic brain syndrome. He did
not feel he had evidence of brain injury from his head trauma
and placed him on Calan. He also had the history that there
had been no loss of consciousness at the time of the accident
5-1-90. An EEG was normal.
Physiatric consultation was obtained from Dr. Mark McGlothlin
for Heal and Company 10-11-90. The doctor's impressions were
closed head injury secondary to a 5-1-90 fall plus probable
seizure disorder, problems of cognition, emotional, behavioral
problems, as well as cervical musculoligamentous strain, right
upper extremity injury, details unknown.
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PRIOR HEADACHE COMPLAINTS
The patient said he had never had headaches before this
accident. I then mentioned to Mr. Blackett that I had seen
him 12-30-87 for chiropractor Richard Wright for severe posttraumatic cervical muscle spasm and headaches. He had fallen
on 12-24-87 while carrying a microwave oven. He struck his
left hip and shoulder and then began having severe neck pain
as well as occipital temporal headaches. His headaches were
described as a 5-6/10 intensity. It is my feeling that the
headaches were related to his cervical ligamentous strain
problem compounded by some cervical arthritis. CT scan of the
cervical spine was normal. Mr. Blackett told me that he had
forgotten all about those severe headaches. He said they
lasted about 3-4 months.
CURRENT COMPLAINTS:
He has headaches that begin at the base of the head which
began one month after the accident. They radiate into the
occipital region and behind his eyes.
They are anywhere
between a 7-9/10 and have been continuous since May of 1990.
They are associated with dry heaves. His scalp feels prickly.
BLACK-OUTS
He last had a black-out July 1, 1991 when he was found by his
son sitting in front of the television with his eyes open and
staring. He is not sure how long the episode lasted. When
it was over he felt as though he had been asleep. He has no
warning before he goes into these episodes. They may occur
sitting or standing, they have never occurred in the recumbent
position. He describes these black-outs having occurred in
July of 1990 and then January of 1991 and the last episode
described. He also has feelings of intermittent vertigo and
dizziness. These are not always clearly related to changes
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in posture.
DEPRESSION
He admits to some degree of depression manifested by lack of
caring and decreased motivation. His libido is good and his
appetite is also good.
PAST INDUSTRIAL INJURIES
In 1985 he hurt his low back at work which resulted in
extruded disc at L5-S1. Surgery was performed 11-13-85 by
neurosurgeon Jack Zahniser at St. Marks Hospital. He did not
do well following that surgery and in fact was out of work for
four years. He was followed extensively by Dr. Stadler at the
Western Rehabilitation Institute.
On 7-15-88 Dr. Stadler
mentioned a failed back syndrome associated with social
problems which were affecting his back pain. On 8-4-88 Dr.
Stadler mentioned an inconsistent examination with symptom
magnification. Evaluation by psychologist, Larry Lighty was
performed for Dr. Stadler and mentioned lack of confidence in
ability to manage painf significant affective distress with
depression and anxiety, psychosocial stressors, minimizing
somatizing coping style, and deconditioning. Problems with
depression were previously mentioned between 1978 and 1990.
The last note from Dr. Stadler to the insurance carrier was
dated 8-4-89 at which time he gave him a 10% impairment rating
for his low back problem. Mr. Blackett was eventually given
that rating from the industrial commission.
EDUCATION:
Mr. Blackett has worked in electronics previously. He did
recently attempt to take an entry examination to get back into
electronics and failed the examination. Things which he said
had been easy for him previously in terms of working in that
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field have now become difficult for him.
He has had two years of junior college in general education.
MEDICATIONS:
Calan which he says has helped his headaches.
HABITS:
Alcohol minimal, tobacco none.
MILITARY HISTORY:
Four years with an honorable discharge
EXAMINATION:
An affable middle aged man who sat comfortably during the
interview. When I brought out my old consultation on him he
then remembered that he had seen me previously. 200 pounds,
5f10,f, right handed.
VITAL SIGNS:
Blood pressure 140/90 sitting, recumbent, and standing.
LUNGS:
Clear
HEART:
No murmurs
ABDOMEN:
There was a well healed midline epigastric scar
CRANIAL NERVES:
II through XII revealed no abnormalities.
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SHOULDERS:
Full range of motion
MOTOR:
Reflexes 2+ and equal, no pathological reflexes, no evidence
of weakness.
SENSATION:
Intact to pin prick throughout.
CEREBELLAR:
Finger to nose, rapid movements, heel to shin, tandem gait
performed well.
SPINE:
Axial loading caused pain referred to the cervical region.
CERVICAL:
Full range of motion, diffusely tender over the cervical
spines, right paracervical musculature.
The muscles were
supple.
DORSAL:
Full rotation, nontender
LUMBOSACRAL:
1+ tender over 3 cm. lumbosacral scar.
supple and he had full range of motion.

The muscles were

STRAIGHT LEG RAISING:
Negative to 70 degrees bilaterally
ASSESSMENT:
Mr. Blackett had a history of an industrial accident in 1985
9

and had a very poor response to surgery to remove an L5-S1
disc. He was out of work for four years. Review of the
records from the Western Rehabilitation Institute revealed
that he had poor coping skills associated with depression,
anxiety, and somatic preoccupation. There were no mention of
headaches until my note in 1987 when he presented with severe
headaches in relationship to a recent industrial fall. Mr.
Blackett had originally told me that he had had no prior
headaches before his fall in Kanab until I brought out the old
records. He said he had totally forgotten about that episode.
I find it incredulous that one would believe that Mr. Blackett
has a post concussion syndrome/organic brain syndrome
secondary to his May 1990 industrial incident. There is no
evidence that he had any loss of consciousness whatsoever.
There was no mention in the original emergency room notes of
any problem with the head, and even Mr. Blackett admitted to
several physicians that there was no loss of consciousness.
In factf he had no headaches develop, according to him, until
a month after the incident and according to the medical
records not until July. The headache mechanism appears to be
related to cervical muscle strain and tension in agreement to
many observers who have seen him. His black-outs appear to
be a syncopal-like episode or they are some type of
dissociative psychological reaction. The bottom line is that
they do not represent any primary cerebral electrical event
such as a seizure. This would be in agreement with the IME
of Dr. Nord and opinion of Dr. Matsuo.
Since there appears to be documentation on the record of an
organic brain syndrome from his psychological evaluation, I
would accept that.
What I would not accept would be an
attempt to find a causal relationship between non-existent
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head injury and the onset of an organic brain syndrome. An
organic brain syndrome would be related to factors other than
his 5-1-90 industrial incident. These factors have not been
identified.
Rather than looking at the 5-1-90 accident as an isolated
event, I feel it has to be looked at in terms of his premorbid
problems including the 1985 back injury and the very prolonged
recovery with much psychological overlay in his recovery.
In terms of reasonable medical probability, I find that h i s
medical diagnoses are:
Headaches chronic and recurring relating
musculoligamentous strain and tension.

to

cervical

Episodic alterations of consciousness not related to seizures
or any other identifiable organic source.
Status post L5-S1 laminectomy discectomy.
Organic
brain
syndrome,
neurodegenerative.

etiology

unclear,

possibly

The above diagnoses are not a result of the industrial
accident of 5-1-90.
His condition has stabilized. I would allow him one month to
have recovered from the industrial accident of 5-1-90. The
only injury that I could identify from that accident was that
of his right upper extremity direct trauma.
There was no permanent partial
industrial accident of 5-1-90.

impairment

due to the
11

7.

Since his problem became so complex following what appeared
to be a relatively minor injury, I would allow the medical
treatment that was subsequently provided to be related to the
5-1-90 injury. I don't feel that the insurance carrier should
have been liable for any additional treatment beyond 9-11-90
when last seen by Dr. Smithf however.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Moress/TT.D. P.C.
GRM:dsm
Tx: 8/22/91
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on July 15, 1991, a copy of the attached
Medical Panel letter in the case of Michael Blackett was mailed to
the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Robert Burgoyne, M.D.

Michael Blackett
2837 Breeze Dr.
Magna, Utah 84044
Robert Breeze, Esq.
211 East 300 So., # 215
SLC, Utah 84111
Deborah Larsen, Esq.
WCFU
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By . ^ ( ^ VTte"
^
Wilma Burrows

State of Utah

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
Timothy C. Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge

160 East 300 South
PO Box 510250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84151-0250
(801)530-6800
(801) 530-6804 (Fax)

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

September 16, 1991

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Michael Blackett
2837 Breeze Dr.
Magna, Utah 84044
Re:
Inj:
Emp:

Michael Blackett
5-1-90
Ralph H. Larsen
Sons

Dear Mr. Blackett:
We are enclosing a copy of the signed report of the Medical
Panel in connection with your claim.
You are allowed fifteen (15) days from the date of this letter
within which to file objections, if you are not satisfied with the
findings of the panel. Please specify in detail the basis of your
objections to each finding and conclusion.
Further, state in
detail the medical evidence or facts you rely on as a basis of your
objection. Copies of objections must be mailed to all parties
concerned.
Parties who desire to submit the matter on written objections
without a hearing may so indicate in a letter accompanying the
objections. A hearing will not be set on the objections unless
there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony. If a hearing
is scheduled, the Medical Panel Chairman will be requested by the
Commission to appear and testify and all parties will be notified
of the time and place of the hearing.
When no objections to a Medical Panel Report are received, the
Administrative Law Judge will decide the case on the record as
currently constituted.
BY DIRECTION;
INDUSTRIAL-COMMISSION OF UTAH
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QM—

TimothyIC. Allen
Administrative Law Judge
TCA:wb
cc:Robert Breeze, Atty., 211 East 300 So.,SLC, UT 84111
Deborah Larsen, Atty. , WCFU
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GARYWM FARNES, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

September 16, 1991

Honorable Timothy Allen
State of Utah
Adjudication Division
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84141-0250
Re:

Michael Blackett

,*-

inj:

5/1/90

^0^^7/17

—,/ ^

--»

Emp:

Ralph H. Larsen & Sons, Inc.

Dear Judge Allen:
I have conferred with Gerald R. Moress, M.D., neurologist, and read
his report concerning the above patient. I agree entirely with Dr.
Moress's conclusions. My opinion is that there was no permanent
partial impairment due to the industrial accident of May 1, 1990,
as I indicated in the psychiatric evaluation, which Dr. Moress is
enclosing with his report. The patient could be suffering from a
somatoform pain disorder. This would indicate that an appropriate
evaluation has uncovered no organic pathology or pathophysiologic
mechanism and the complaint of pain or impairment is in excess of
what would be expected from the physical findings. I indicated
that there was a possibility that this diagnosis would be related
to the May 1, 1990 injury. If so, the injury would not be a direct
cause, but provide an avenue to develop the pain. The insurance
courier should not be liable for this, because in my opinion this
would be a result of the person's psychological make-up.
If you need more information from me, please let me know.
Yours respectfully,

2/
H. Burgbyne,MiD .S
Psychiatrist
^
'
/mb

fc-J 063
Facilities of Intermountain Health Care

Tab 7

Appendix Number 7
Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9
Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel

R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the followi
guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical
panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generall>
significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary more than 5% of the whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date
which vary more than 90 days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if
there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarif
the medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicti
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing,
re-submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to b<
examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment
rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be non-industrial,
and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical
consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for
further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
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Tab 8

Appendix Number 8
Motion for Review
February 26, 1992
(R. 84-85)

ROBERT BREEZE #4278
Attorney for Claimant
211 East Broadway #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2138
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
MICHAEL BLACKETT,

)

Applicant,

MOTION FOR REVIEW

)

vs.

)

RALPH H. LARSEN & SONS, INC.
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,

)
)
)

Case No. 86001152

)

Honorable Timothy C. Allen

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Applicant herein who moves the Commission for an
Order reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge on the
foillowing grounds:
1.

The Administrative Law Judge failed to refer the matter

of Compensation Neurosis back to the Medical Panel for a full
analysis of whether the somatoform pain disorder was in fact caused
by the industrial injury.
WHEREFORE, Claimant prays for the following relief:
1.

For

an

Order

remanding

the

matter

back

to

the

Administrative Law Judge with instructions to refer this case back
to the Medical Panel for a full evaluation of the somatoform pain
disorder and the issue of causation related to Temporary Total and

084

Permanent Partial Disability.
DATED this

day of February, 1992

ROBERT BREEZE N Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to:
Deborah Larsen
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on this

^C?

day of February, 1992.
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